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ABSTRACT  
 
Working on a sample of OECD countries spanning the period 1970-2003, 
this paper contributes to the Feldstein-Horioka literature by making three main 
innovations: (1) It estimates, for the first time, regressions at the institutional 
sector level (households, corporations, and government); (2) It explores the 
asymmetry between current account deficits and surpluses; and (3) It uses 
advanced panel data techniques to deal with endogeneity and to distinguish 
long- and short-run effects. The conclusions of the paper are that: (i) The 
national Feldstein-Horioka coefficient is in the vicinity of 0.5, but sectoral 
coefficients are much lower, a puzzling result possibly explained by 
endogenous intersectoral saving and investment links; (iii) The FH coefficients 
are higher in deficit than in surplus years; and (iv) The long-run relationship is 
in all cases below 1, which raises the question as to whether the intertemporal 
budget constraint should be interpreted. 
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REVISITING THE FELDSTEIN-HORIOKA PUZZLE: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL SECTOR VIEW 
 
RICARDO BEBCZUK AND KLAUS SCHMIDT-HEBBEL1 
I. Introduction 
The seminal paper of Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (1980) 
unleashed a heated debate that still mesmerizes scholars and remains at the 
center of the macroeconomic research agenda. In its simplest form, the 
Feldstein-Horioka (henceforth, FH) test consists of running a regression of the 
national investment rate on the national saving rate, either for cross-section, 
time series or panel data. Let β be the estimated coefficient. Allegedly, β=1 
indicates financial autarky (the usual macroeconomic identity of a closed 
economy) and β=0 signals full capital mobility. FH´s finding that the 
investment and saving rates are highly correlated has proven to be a robust 
stylized fact for both industrial and developing countries over time. Our 
principal goal is to bring attention into the institutional sector breakdown of 
saving and investment under the conviction that it should enrich our 
understanding of this famous and polemic issue in international finance. We 
will be working with a unbalanced sample of OECD countries spanning the 
period 1970-2003. The choice of this particular dataset was motivated by the 
unavailability of investment and saving time series by institutional sector in 
most countries and because the odds that Feldstein-Horioka should fail are the 
highest in view of their level of economic, institutional and financial 
development. The widespread statistical acceptance of a sizable yet decreasing 
correlation becomes, as a result, both intriguing and challenging. 
Indeed, the correspondence between high capital mobility and the value of 
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of Argentina; comments from two anonymous referees are appreciated. We are also grateful for 
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β is disputable on intuitive grounds. For example, as discussed in Sachsida and 
Caetano (2000), a country running each year a constant current account deficit 
to GDP of 10% with investment and saving to GDP moving upward and 
downward at the same pace would yield a β coefficient equal to one, even 
though most people would characterize this country as facing high capital 
mobility. One can come up with other odd cases: The same country with its 
constant 10% external deficit, but with investment and saving stuck over time 
at 30% and 20% of GDP, would have now a zero β coefficient. Moreover, 
some empirical studies take the proportion of the change in investment 
financed with external saving as a measure of capital mobility (see Sachs 
(1981) and Glick and Rogoff (1995)), but such measure is difficult to reconcile 
with the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient. Put in other words, FH is a nice 
measure of how well the current account varies to fill the gaps between 
investment and saving, when the latter variables are subjected to large and 
asymmetric shocks, but it is not the ultimate test of capital mobility.  
Nevertheless, the intellectual and policy value of the Feldstein-Horioka test 
should not be undermined by this controversy. At the end of the day, it 
remains a powerful test of international financial constraints. In perfect 
international capital markets (free from intermediation costs, asymmetric 
information, and other frictions), a country should be indifferent to finance its 
investment with domestic or foreign saving. On the contrary, evidence that 
domestic investment tracks domestic saving implies that international capital 
mobility is not perfect. Rephrasing, a β coefficient positive and significantly 
different from zero supports the lack of full capital mobility. This approach is 
borrowed from the test designed for individual companies by Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen (1988), who run investment equations on internal funds, claiming 
that a positive and significant coefficient, after controlling for investment 
opportunities, is an indication of financial constraints.2,3  
                                                          
2 Hubbard (1998) extensively reviews the literature and cites several sources of disagreement 
over the validity of the test, some of them along the same lines as those against the Feldstein-
Horioka test. But as in the latter case,  this test has been resilient to criticism and is still widely 
used in finance. 
 
3 For the most part, studies on national and corporate financial constraints do not take into 
account wealth stocks. This might give rise to misleading conclusions, as a non significant 
correlation of investment and saving may be due to fluid access to credit and/or the use of 
accumulated financial assets. However, we will not pursue this issue throughout the paper. 
ECONÓMICA 
 
6
The critique that has shed the darkest shadows over the validity of this test 
as a measure of capital mobility is that they might be an artifact of economic 
and statistical shortcomings. For the sake of exposition, we can classify the 
arguments into the following categories: 
a. Endogeneity. Whenever the saving rate is positively correlated with the 
error term, the β coefficient will be upward biased, regardless of the true 
degree of financial constraints. One frequently raised case in the literature is 
that saving and investment might react in a similar fashion to third economic 
forces other than financial constraints (see for example Payne (2005), and 
Loayza et al. (2000) and Serven (2002) on the empirics of private saving and 
investment, respectively). As an illustration, a higher GDP growth rate is 
likely to simultaneously increase current saving and investment. Likewise, as 
governments may set narrow targets of current account imbalances, measures 
may be in place to maintain a tight correlation of saving and investment by, 
say, modifying interest rates or the fiscal balance.  
Nevertheless, a note of caution is in order. The endogeneity argument may 
wrongly lead to believe that one should ideally specify a full model of the 
saving and the investment rate before running the Feldstein-Horioka test. This 
is not the spirit behind this test. For one, no matter how many saving and 
investment determinants one can come up with, in a closed economy both 
variables will be equalized due to the binding financial constraint. 
Consequently, the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient will be one, truthfully 
reflecting the fact that the country has no financial ties with the rest of the 
world. Secondly, in a more realistic setting of imperfect capital mobility, one 
might want to control for the effect of omitted variables causing a correlation 
between investment and saving not explained by financial constraints. As 
usual in the instrumental variables literature, this task can prove to be 
formidable and not entirely convincing. Financial constraints are not directly 
observable, and their intensity is intertwined with several macroeconomic 
variables in a complex way. For example, a temporary productivity shock 
tends to increase both saving and investment. As a result, we are tempted to 
control for, say, the GDP growth rate. However, the macroeconomic literature 
states that the excess sensitivity of saving and investment to current GDP 
growth may well be explained also by myopia or financial constraints. In the 
latter case, the unexplained residuals –after controlling for the productivity 
shock- will not necessarily capture the financial constraint that was intended to 
isolate in the first place, rendering a low but not fully reliable coefficient. 
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In sum, by controlling for other saving and investment determinants, one is 
taking the delicate risk of transforming a supposedly spurious coefficient 
biased upward (towards one) into another potentially spurious coefficient 
biased downward (towards zero). Even though there is no obvious solution for 
this caveat, our results, to be shown momentarily, seem to be robust enough to 
the available endogeneity tests. 
 
b. Intertemporal budget constraint. In order to meet this budget constraint, 
saving and investment should be equal to each other in the long run, but not 
necessarily in the short run. 4 
This paper makes an original contribution to the FH literature by exploring 
the institutional sector dimension in OECD countries. The mounting work on 
this puzzle has so far neglected the implications of the household, corporate 
and government components of the national saving and investment rates.5 Why 
this research angle is of utmost relevance comes from the very fact that 
countries are just abstract entities. Actually, those who engaged (or not) in 
financial relations with the rest of the world and with each other are the 
households, the corporations, and the government. To draw any sound policy 
advice on financial openness, a clear understanding of sectoral behavior is 
called for. For instance, from an economic growth perspective, a financially-
constrained corporate sector is more pervasive than the household or the 
government sector going through such situation; on the contrary, financial 
stability would likely be less at risk with a financially-constrained government 
sector, especially in developing economies. Equally important, the comparison 
between the national β coefficient and the sectoral β coefficients provides a 
priori a nice test of international vis-à-vis intranational financial constraints, 
allowing to have a better grasp about how financial markets work within 
                                                          
4 Another related criticism is that the Feldstein-Horioka coefficient may approach one with a 
sufficiently large sample of countries. Take the extreme case of a sample including all countries 
in the world.. It is true that the correlation between world saving and investment is by 
construction one (the world is a closed economy), but as long as there exists capital movements 
across countries, the resulting Feldstein-Horioka estimate may take any value. 
5 The only (at least to our knowledge) two papers that test FH paying attention to sectoral 
decomposition reach conflicting results. Argimon and Roldan (1994) investigate the casual 
relationship between the saving-investment gaps of the government and the private sector in 
European countries over 1960-1988 without finding any connection. However, Iwamoto and van 
Wincoop (2000) report negative correlations of more than 80% for OECD countries in 1975-
1990.  
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countries by taking a closer look at intersectoral flows.  
Beyond the data-related value added, our work advances in other fronts, 
especially in tackling the caveats cited above. First, we test the robustness of 
our results by using different panel data techniques and by accounting for 
common and fiscal factors affecting saving and investment. Second, we split 
the sample into current account deficits and surpluses to unveil possible 
asymmetries. Finally, we employ novel dynamic panel data estimators to 
distinguish long- and short-run investment-saving comovements.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 1, we describe our 
database and highlight some stylized facts. In Section 2, we run our baseline 
national and sectoral Feldstein-Horioka regressions, with and without 
controlling for potential common factors. A fiscal behavior approach is put 
forward in Section 3 to interpret our findings, which are further dissected by 
separating deficit and surplus years in Section 4. The distinction between long-
run and short-run sensitivity of investment to saving is discussed in Section 5. 
Some conclusions close.  
II. Stylized Observations 
Before going into the econometrics, several patterns in the series (in all 
cases, gross rates to GDP) involved will be underlined, some of which will 
help rationalize later findings. Tables 1 to 8 report country averages and 
standard deviations of the saving, investment and current account rates to GDP 
at the national and sectoral levels. The following facts stand out:  
(i) In spite of being a rather homogeneous set of countries, pronounced 
differences in investment and saving rates strike the eye, both for national and 
sectoral figures. For example, the national saving rate ranges from 15.7% in 
the UK to 32.6% in Korea and 31.2% in Switzerland. Incidentally, the 
dispersion is higher in saving than in investment rates; 
(ii) The corporate sector generates on average more saving than any other 
sector in the economy, although in 6 out of the 16 countries it is the household 
saving the one leading the saving statistics. On the investment side, the 
corporate sector contributes with the bulk of the national investment (57.9%), 
although the household and government sectors are responsible for significant 
fractions (28.7% and 13.4%).6 This defies the usual textbook claim that 
                                                          
6 Conventional national accounting may misclassify some expenditures items such as durable 
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households save and businesses invest, with the financial system acting as the 
intermediary of funds; 
(iii) The average national current account is just 0.6%, but, again, huge 
differences across countries are found. The range goes from –4.4% in 
Australia to 7.6% in Switzerland. These figures indicate that foreign saving 
finances a marginal portion of domestic saving (2.4% on average and a 
maximum of 17.5% in Australia); 
(iv) Current accounts behave quite differently across sectors. Households 
have an average surplus of 3.4% of GDP (with only 3 deficit countries), while 
corporations and governments display deficits of 1.6% and 1.2% respectively;  
(v) Elemental macroeconomic theory leads us to expect that the current 
account is more volatile than both consumption and investment, based on the 
role of shock absorber of the current account under capital mobility. 
Strikingly, we find in the sample that the current account is roughly as volatile 
as the saving rate in national and sectoral data, and that the saving rate is on 
average at least as volatile as the investment rate, even though this is not a 
regularity on a country-by-country basis (see Fanelli (2005a, 2005b) for a 
thorough discussion on volatility in macroeconomic variables).7 
III. Baseline Econometric Results 
We start by running the FH equation for national investment and saving, as 
well as for household, corporate and government figures, using three panel 
data techniques: pooled OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects. The results 
presented in Table 9 point towards a national coefficient ranging between 0.43 
and 0.60, much in line with previous studies.8 Our main interest, though, are 
                                                                                                                                            
goods and education as household consumption rather than investment, and something similar 
can be said of public expenditures on education and health, among others. Unfortunately, data is 
not readily available to produce these alternative measures of saving and investment for the 
complete sample. However, such statistical adjustment is most unlikely to alter our econometric 
results in a significant way. For that to happen, we should assume that the degree of financial 
constraints for the additional investment items is utterly different than for the type of 
expenditures currently recorded in our investment measures. Since there is neither theoretical 
nor empirical support for this assumption, we believe that the results would be robust to this test. 
7 It could be argued that it is private saving and investment what should be looked at, as stated 
by the corporate veil literature. Nevertheless, results do not change qualitatively.  
8 For example, Boyreau and Wei (2004) obtain for the whole, balanced OECD sample an 
estimate of 0.71 in 1960-1977 and 0.46 for 1978-2001. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) show 
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the sectoral coefficients, and they are consistently lower than the national one. 
The household FH coefficient is always significant and varies from 0.15 to 
0.17. The corporate and government coefficients are not significantly positive, 
except in the pooled OLS specification. However, a Chow test indicates that 
the latter method is inconsistent vis-à-vis Fixed Effects, implying that the 
intercept homogeneity constraint is rejected, so we will disregard the pooled 
model and focus instead in the other estimators from now on.9 Consequently, 
we are able to claim that the household coefficient is about one third of the 
national one, and that the positive investment-saving correlation disappears at 
the corporate and government levels. In Chart 1 we show rolling estimates of β 
covering the entire 1970-2003, from which it can be observed a marked 
reduction of the national and corporate coefficients, yet not steady, from the 
1970s to the early 2000s. In turn, the household and government βs seem to 
have been more stable over time. For all time windows, the fact remains that 
the national coefficient exceeds the sectoral coefficients, and the government 
always displays the lowest one.10  
As mentioned in the Introduction, FH exercises are sometimes said to be 
driven by the existence of common factors explaining saving and investment 
and not by imperfect capital mobility. To put our results to the test, we will 
follow two procedures. The first one builds on Iwamoto and van Wincoop 
(2000), who perform a conditional FH test for OECD countries and Japanese 
regions to eliminate usual suspects that may jointly shape saving and 
investment decisions, and then use the unexplained residuals of the 
corresponding regressions to estimate a common-factor-free FH coefficient. 
The estimated β become insignificantly different from zero in their time-series 
exercises as such controls are entered. While an ingenious procedure, it is 
disputable whether to attribute the weakening of the saving-investment 
relationship to a successful elimination of the endogeneity bias, as discussed 
                                                                                                                                            
even lower values for the European Union over the 1990s. 
9 Hausman tests were unconclusive regarding the choice between random and fixed effects 
across the different regressions. However, as the coefficients are quite similar to each other, this 
does not represent a serious dilemma. 
10 We used a recursive method, by which we start with the period 1970-1979, and then we add 
additional observations to obtain estimates for 1970-1980, 1970-1981, and so on until getting 
the value for 1970-2003. The reported coefficient corresponds to the random effects estimation. 
It must be recalled that the number of observations increases with the span of the (unbalanced) 
sample. 
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above in the paper. Nonetheless, as far as the estimated coefficients do not 
change in response to the inclusion of new controls in both sides of the 
equation, the baseline results should look more reliable.  
After demeaning annual data by subtracting annual cross-country averages 
–which is equivalent to introducing time dummy variables but preserves 
degrees of freedom- as a means of eliminating common international systemic 
factors, we controlled both investment and saving for GDP growth, the 
inflation rate and per capita GDP and used the resulting residuals to compute 
the FH coefficient, yielding the estimates shown in Table 10. Previous results 
in this Section stay the same to a great extent, with the exception of the 
government coefficient that becomes significant, but still below a value of 
0.05. 
Yet another test of robustness is to employ internal instruments by applying 
the GMM system technique on both the unconditional and the conditional 
regressions as a way of dealing with the potential endogeneity of saving –see 
the Annex for a description of this method.11 Again, no noteworthy change is 
observed, as revealed by Table 11.12 
After discarding the presence of spurious correlations, we are prepared to 
concentrate ourselves on a new puzzle within the FH puzzle, as the marked 
contrast between the national and sectoral results begs some interpretation. 
IV. A New Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle? 
Is it sensible to expect the national FH coefficient to be higher than sectoral 
coefficients? Since the interaction between the private and the public sector is 
key to approach this question, we will do some elementary algebra to shed 
light on this finding. FH states that si β= , where i and s are the investment 
and saving rates, respectively, and β is the FH coefficient. As national 
investment can be expressed as gp iii += , that is, the sum of private and 
                                                          
11 We used the second to the sixth lags as instruments in the GMM exercises conducted 
throughout the paper. Results were in general (but not always) robust to changes in the lag 
structure. Sargan and first- and second-order autocorrelation tests indicate that no specification 
problems were present.  
12 Actually, the irrelevance of common factors should not come as a total surprise. Recalling that 
past studies encountered that FH coefficients declined in a noticeable way over time, it is 
difficult to attribute this downward trend to a time-varying influence of third variables.  
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public investment, and that there exist sectoral FH relationships of the form 
ppp si β=  and ggg si β= , the national FH coefficient can be written as 
)/()/( ssss ggpp βββ += , namely, a weighted average of sectoral 
coefficients, with the weights being the proportions in national saving.13 This 
gives an intuitive answer that clashes with the empirical results: a country 
cannot be more financially-constrained than their domestic institutional 
sectors. Rephrasing, if the Fisher separation theorem between saving and 
investment holds for each sector, it must necessarily hold for the country as a 
whole, once the national saving and investment rates are just the sum of the 
sectoral rates –all coefficients, national and sectoral, must be closed to zero. 
Likewise, if each sector finances its investment solely with its own saving (the 
sectoral coefficients are one), the national coefficient must also be one.  
The previous relationship implicitly assumes that there is no systematic 
linkage among the sectoral current accounts. If we rule out this assumption, it 
is possible to rationalize the coexistence of a high national and low sectoral FH 
coefficients. Suppose the case in which sg – ig = α(sp – ip)  and sh – ih = γ(sc – 
ic), where α≤0 and γ≤0.  Redefining the national FH equation as s – i = (1-β) s 
and inserting the above equations, then  β=1-[(1+α)(1+γ) (1-βc) sc/s]. Note for 
any given value of βc, the lower α and γ, the higher β.14 As an extreme 
example, if α=-1 and γ=-1, then  β=1 even with βc=0. Therefore, under this 
framework, we may observe a national coefficient higher than the sectoral 
ones, the reason being that the independence between saving and investment 
for any particular sector (implying a low sectoral β) will be partially mirrored, 
with the opposite sign, by one or both of the other sectors, thus causing a high 
national β. 
What is more challenging is the interpretation of this evidence, which is 
consistent with at least four storylines: (a) The government aims to target a 
balanced national current account by running a surplus (deficit) every time the 
private sector runs a deficit (surplus); (b) There exists a negative relationship 
between private and public saving via Ricardian equivalence; (c) There is a 
crowding-out effect in financial markets, by which whenever the government 
                                                          
13 As a matter of fact, taking into account the usual constant term in each regression, one should 
add a new term equal to the sum of the sectoral constants minus the national constant. 
14 The argument does not change if the equation is defined in terms of any of the other two 
sectoral coefficients.  
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runs a deficit, the interest rate goes up, boosting private saving and hampering 
private investment, namely, reducing the current account deficit of the private 
sector or increasing its surplus;15 (d) Household saving responds negatively to 
changes in corporate saving, as posited by the corporate veil literature; and 
finally, (e) There is limited international capital mobility but high intranational 
capital mobility across sectors, so surplus sectors finance deficit sectors.  
Ideally, we would like to be able to discern whether the explanation for our 
finding has to do with capital mobility consideration, the latest argument in the 
previous paragraph, or with any of the other conjectures.16 Unfortunately, it 
would be excessively daring on our part to settle this debate without a fully 
specified model, which is well beyond the scope of this paper -we aim instead 
to presenting some stylized facts about these investment-saving correlations at 
the sectoral level. 
V. Deficits, Surpluses and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
The basic notion behind FH is that investment and saving move in tandem 
because the country or sector cannot invest beyond the amount of own 
resources it disposes of. This opens up the possibility of asymmetric 
correlations under current account deficits and surpluses. We should expect 
that investment would not deviate much from saving when facing a deficit 
under less-than-full capital mobility, but there is no reason to predict the same 
close relationship under a surplus, as saving can be as much larger than 
investment as desired.17 To test the hypothesis, we created two annual dummy 
variables, with value 1 if a current account deficit (surplus) is observed, and 0 
otherwise, which we then interacted with the saving rate. A positive and larger 
coefficient is expected on the Deficit vis-à-vis the Surplus resulting 
explanatory variables. Table 12 shows the estimates obtained by the same 
                                                          
15 It is possible for a crowding-in effect to exist between public and private investment when 
public investment foster the marginal productivity of private projects. However, this would 
create a positive rather negative interaction between the public and private current accounts (for 
given saving rates). 
16 Through elemental unreported regressions we find preliminary support for all these 
hypotheses. 
17 Of course, the latter assertion relies on the realistic assumption that there are no capital 
controls limiting financial investment for surplus units, which became the predominant case in 
the sample from the early 1970s, when our sample begins –until then, controls were in place in 
some countries for investments abroad. 
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methods used in earlier sections, confirming our belief: FH correlations are in 
general much stronger for deficit than for surplus years –although the 
coefficient on corporate deficits is not significant in the GMM regression. For 
the Deficit variable, the correlation climbs to around 0.5 for households and to 
0.3 for corporations, while for the Surplus variable, it reaches about 0.2 for 
households but stays non-significant for corporations (save for the significant 
0.1 with the random effects estimation). As in previous sections, we find 
higher values at the national level vis-à-vis sectoral levels and, once again, the 
government sector happens to yield non-positive correlations in all cases.  
We will highlight two new findings. First, the recovered significance of the 
FH correlation for deficit figures implies that financial constraints do seem to 
exist at the end of the day for the household and corporate sectors every time 
investment exceeds saving. Even though the estimates are in the lower bound 
within the empirical FH literature, they are still far from negligible. In turn, the 
higher correlation for household vis-à-vis corporations looks a priori 
reasonable, once one should believe the average household to be more 
financially constrained than the average corporation because of differences in 
size, age, and available collateral, all of which have a bearing on 
intermediation costs and the extent of informational asymmetries. These 
frictions become especially acute in international borrowing, where exchange 
rate uncertainty, exacerbated informational problems, and judicial and 
institutional barriers are at play –indeed, households rarely access international 
credit markets. 
The second and more intricate fact is the significant household surplus 
coefficient, , which is certainly not what the standard theory predicts regarding 
the separation of investment and saving decisions in the absence of financial 
constraints. Even though, as mentioned above, the correlation coefficient is 
rather low, it is highly significant and robust, thus deserving some brief 
analysis. The obvious candidate for explaining this is, once more, the influence 
of common factors on saving and investment, but we can quickly reject it after 
recalling that common factors did not appear to drive our baseline results. 
Anyway, we repeated the procedure of Section 2 and ran individual 
regressions of investment and saving on GDP growth, the inflation rate and per 
capita GDP for deficit observations, on one hand, and for surplus observations, 
on the other hand, and then computed the FH coefficient for the corresponding 
residuals. Had the surplus coefficient dropped significantly, there would have 
been some ground to blame common factors for the positive correlation in 
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surplus times, but the (unreported) results were similar to the previous ones. A 
plausible alternative rationale is that, in simultaneously deciding saving and 
investment, each sector would be trying not to run excessive surpluses. After 
all, sacrificing current consumption pays off as long as the ensuing wealth 
accumulation allows economic units to avoid undesirable fluctuations in future 
consumption and investment. In this view, economic agents likely set an 
optimal rate of wealth accumulation based, among other factors, on their 
current wealth stocks, their forecasted income volatility, and their attitude 
towards risk. Once reached this optimal level, agents would prefer raising their 
consumption rather than their wealth, limiting their current account surpluses 
and strengthening the investment-saving correlation. 
VI. Intertemporal Budget Constraint and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle 
Perhaps the most popular explanation for the strong correlation between 
saving and investment is that a country must meet its budget constraint in the 
long run, so current account deficits (surpluses) will be compensated by future 
surpluses (deficits). We study this issue by looking at the total and sectoral 
investment-saving relationships in the long- and short-run using the Pooled 
Mean Group (PMG) methodology, adopting a ARDL (1,1) structure.18  This 
methodology is appealing because it enables to distinguish long-run and short-
run effects in panel data, testing at the same time whether there is long-run 
homogeneity across units while maintaining short-run country heterogeneity. 
We offer additional details on this technique in the context of our present 
application in the Annex. We will work with unconditional Feldstein-Horioka 
regressions because the core of the argument revolves around the observed 
levels of investment and saving, no matter what underlying factors explain 
them. 
The regression output appears in Table 13. Regarding total investment and 
saving, our first finding is that the long-run relationship is 0.75, with a lower 
short-run response of 0.25. The negative error correction term of 0.29 ensures 
the stability of the model and shows that half of the adjustment takes place in 
just 2.4 years.19 Does the rejection of the hypothesis that the long-run 
                                                          
18 Results were not sensitive to the change in the lag structure. 
19 Also using PMG, Pelgrin and Schich (2004) find for a balanced sample of  20 OECD 
countries a long-run coefficient of 0.93 for 1960-1999 and 0.92 for 1970-1999, with an error 
correction estimate of -0.33 in both cases and short-run effects of 0.25 and 0.22. 
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coefficient is equal to 1 immediately mean that the intertemporal budget 
constraint is not satisfied? Our answer is no, as the notion of long run is 
somewhat arbitrary for a country, whose planning horizon is quite long. 
Particularly, for industrial countries, current account imbalances are observed 
for extended periods of time.20 In the end, the need to have a balanced current 
account over rather short periods obeys to reputational considerations in 
international markets, which affect more heavily developing countries. At any 
rate, our sample does not look long enough to expect a one-to-one relationship 
between saving and investment in OECD countries.  It must also be noted that 
the fact that the coefficient is not above 1 guarantees that the stock of external 
debt does not grow unboundedly.  
All the sectoral long-run results are well below 1, with the corporate sector 
in the upper limit (0.58) and the household and government sectors in the 
lower one (0.078 and 0.062, respectively). In all cases, the error correction 
term is negative, as surprisingly are the short-run impacts. According to the 
Hausman test, the long-run parameter homogeneity cannot statistically be 
rejected in any of the equations, even though country-specific short-run 
responses vary in a noticeable fashion.21 This homogeneity constraint explains 
the efficiency gains of the PMG over the MG reflected in the lower standard 
deviations of the estimates. 
At this point we are concerned about the different long-run coefficient 
across sectors. For the non-significant government coefficient, the most 
sensible motive is that sovereign borrowers, especially in developed countries, 
enjoy a reputational and tax-levying advantage over private borrowers in local 
and foreign capital markets, which allows them to issue debt with much longer 
maturities and easy rollover. As for the difference between the corporate and 
the household sector, our main hypothesis goes along the same lines as those 
sketched in Section 4: the time frame to meet the intertemporal budget 
constraint is different for deficit and surplus economic units. Our previous 
analysis documented that financial constraints do arise once investment 
exceeds saving. In our sample, households are typically surplus units and 
corporations are deficit units.22 In this light, the corporate sector is forced to, at 
                                                          
20 A case in point, among others, is Australia, whose current account has been strongly negative 
in all but 18 years since 1861 (see Cashin and Wickham (1998)). 
21 For space reasons, the short-run coefficients are not reported, but are available from the 
authors upon request.  
22 Over the total sample of 390 observations, a current account deficit was recorded in 55 cases 
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least partially, repay its debt in the long-run, creating a positive nexus between 
investment and saving. The surplus household sector, on the contrary, is in 
position to decide more freely its saving and investment rates not only in the 
short- but also in the long-run.23 A complementary reason that warrants the 
less-than-unitary coefficient is an aggregation issue: while the government is 
both a sector and a legal unit per se, there are millions of corporations and 
households. As a result, even though each of them may satisfy their own 
budget constraints, the sector as a whole may look as if not. In a simplistic 
example, suppose non-overlapping corporations living each just one period. At 
the end of the first period, the first company pays its debt and ceases to exist, 
but simultaneously the second one starts up and raises debt. Going on and on, 
corporate debt as a whole will not necessarily go down, regardless of the fact 
that each individual company respects its budget constraint in the short-run.24 
In our particular empirical application, this atomization blurs to some extent 
the long-run analysis on the household and corporate sectors.  
Of importance here is also to underline that the fiscal view is still valid 
here: if the government targets the current account –as advanced in Section 3-, 
then the long-run national coefficient may be high even if the country is not 
required to meet its intertemporal budget constraint.25 In consequence, the 
presence of a national coefficient higher than each and every sectoral long-run 
FH coefficient can be interpreted as before, with the additional upward 
influence of the high and positive corporate sector coefficient.  
To close, it is worth noting that the cross-section regressions, a crude 
approximation to the long-run relationship, yield estimates of 0.59, 0.51, 0.19 
and 0.16 for the national, corporate, household and government equations, 
somewhat similar to the PMG long-run coefficients of 0.75, 0.58, 0.078 and 
0.062. 
                                                                                                                                            
(14.1%) for households and in 276 cases (70.8%) for corporations. 
23 Of course, in the long-run (whatever long-run means in our intertemporal problem) 
households have to satisfy their transversality condition (not leaving unconsumed wealth), 
unless bequests or other motives cause them to deviate from it. 
24 The usually growing levels of domestic credit to the private sector in most countries is an 
eloquent piece of evidence of this kind of heterogeneity at the interior of the corporate and 
household sectors. 
25 But this does not work the other way around, as a high long-run coefficient does not 
necessarily imply a high short-run coefficient. 
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VII.  Conclusions 
Our goal in this paper was to re-examine the so-called Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle introducing several data, economic and statistical innovations. Our 
findings, some of which question established assumptions and previous results 
in the literature, can be summarized as follows: (i) The national Feldstein-
Horioka coefficient is in the vicinity of 0.5, but sectoral coefficients are much 
lower and even insignificantly different from zero; (ii) Such positive and 
significant national coefficient do not necessarily reflect frictions in 
international credit markets but might be related to endogenous intersectoral 
saving and investment links; (iii) Nevertheless, when the sample is split into 
deficit and surplus years, a higher and significant correlation emerges for the 
former at the national, household, and corporate level, implying that credit 
imperfections may still play a role for the private but not for the public sector; 
and (iv) Against the background of a unitary long-run coefficient to satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint, the long-run relationship is 0.75 for national 
data, 0.6 for the corporate sector, and marginally or non-significant at the 
household and government level. 
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Appendix: GMM and PGM estimators 
Two modern dynamic panel data procedures are employed along with the 
more usual random and fixed effect techniques, namely, the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators. 
Given their relative novelty in the applied macroeconomic field, we devote a 
few lines to explain how they work. 
GMM has two evident advantages: first, it allows to deal with the 
inconsistency created by the presence of the lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor; second, it allows to relax the assumption of strict exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Our basic regression will be of the form: 
tiitititi savinvinv ,,21,1, εµββ +++= −    i = 1, ..., N         t = 1, ..., T     
where inv is the investment rate, sav is the saving rate, i stands for each of 
the N cross-section units, t represents each of the T time-series units, β1 and β2 
are scalar, µi and εi,t are an individual-specific effect and an error term, 
respectively, with zero mean and constant and finite variance and independent 
of each other.  
A major drawback with this specification is that the introduction of the 
lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable gives rise to biased and 
inconsistent estimators. The reason is that both invi,t and invi,t-1 are functions of 
µi. By first-differencing the previous equation, it is possible to account for the 
unobserved individual effects to obtain: 
)()()( 1,,1,,22,1,11,, −−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi savsavinvinvinvinv εεββ
 
It can be observed that there still is correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the new error term. If the error εi,t is serially 
uncorrelated [E(εi,tεi,s)=0 for t≠s], values of inv lagged two periods or more are 
valid instruments, so for t ≥ 3 the following linear moment restrictions are 
satisfied: 
       0])[( 2,1,, =− −− tititi invE εε                       t = 3, ..., T              
Furthermore, we will assume that the saving rate weakly exogenous, 
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meaning that future (but not necessarily contemporaneous and lagged) 
realizations of the error term are uncorrelated with the x set. Formally, E(savi,tε
i,s)≠0 for t≥s and E(savi,tεi,s)=0 otherwise. This suggests that values of x lagged 
two periods or more serve as instruments, with the associated additional linear 
moment restrictions: 
0])[( 2,1,, =− −− tititi savE εε      t = 3, ..., T     
           
Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a consistent Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator from these moment restrictions. This method has 
the additional advantage that does not rely on any particular probability 
distribution. Moreover, they distinguish a one-step and a two-step estimator, 
the difference being that in the latter case the residuals from the former are 
used to reestimate the coefficients.  
Nonetheless, Blundell and Bond (1998) notice that lagged levels of the 
dependent variable may become poor instruments as far as this variable is 
highly persistent over time –as a matter of fact, the estimated coefficient is 
biased toward zero when the autorregressive parameter approaches one. In 
such a case,  lagged differences of the dependent variable can serve as suitable 
instruments in the level regressions, provided this new instrument is 
uncorrelated with the fixed effect, which in turn require that the dependent 
variable be mean stationary. All this boils down into an additional set of 
moment restrictions: 
0)])([( ,2,1, =+− −− tiititi invinvE εη        
0)])([( ,2,1, =+− −− tiititi savsavE εη             t = 3, ..., T     
  
By stacking  the equations in differences with the equations in levels, a 
GMM system estimator results with superior performance in terms of 
unbiasedness and asymptotic efficiency. 
An additional issue we would like to address is whether short- and long-run 
effects can be distinguished. Standard panel data techniques restrict the 
ECONÓMICA 
 
24
estimated coefficients to be the same for all cross-section units, allowing at 
most for group-specific intercepts by using fixed-effects. At the other extreme, 
in the case of full panel heterogeneity, a mean group (MG) estimator -the 
average of the estimated coefficients from separate equations for each group- 
is consistent. Since in most cases we should expect parameter homogeneity in 
the long-run but not in the short-run, an intermediate estimator should be 
considered. The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999) appears as a sensible alternative. If the long-run 
homogeneity constraint is valid, the PMG will be consistent and efficient, but 
if it is not, it will be, unlike the MG estimator, inconsistent. This constraint can 
be tested with a Hausman test on each explanatory variable. Another caveat of 
the MG estimator is that, when the time and cross-section dimensions are 
short, it is quite sensitive to outliying country estimates. This comes from the 
fact that the MG estimator is an unweighted average of individual group 
estimators, and thus it suffers from the same problem as any average. The 
PMG estimator is more akin to a weighted average. Specifically, the method 
first estimates the common or pooled  long-run coefficients, and then uses 
them to estimate the short-run coefficients and the speed of adjustment. The 
unweighted average of all these estimates is a consistent estimate of the short-
run effects. 
Suppose that the  investment rate follows an autorregressive, distributed lag 
(ARDL)  process of order (1, 1): 
ittiittiiit savsavinvinv εβββµ ++++= −− 1,321,1  
Subtracting invit,-1 from both sides and adding and subtracting β3savit in the 
right-hand side, we obtain the error correction equation: 
[ ] itititti
ititit
i
tiit
savsinv
savsavinvinv
εββ
εββ
ββ
β
µβ
+∆+−−−=
+∆+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+−−−−−=∆
−
−
3
*
1,1
3
1
32
1
1,1
)1(
)1(
)(
)1(
)1(
where s* is the common long-run solution and ∆ is the difference operator. The 
PMG first estimates the common long-run effects [ ])1/( 1βµ −i  and 
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[ ])1/()( 132 βββ −+  to later on estimate the short-run coefficient β3 and the 
speed of adjustment [ ])1( 1β−− . 
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Figure 1 
Feldstein-Horioka Coefficient: Rolling recursive estimations, 1970-2003 
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Table 1 
Gross National Saving and Investment to GDP: 
Country Averages 
 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 23.7 20.1 3.7 
UK 15.7 17.9 -2.1 
Switzerland 31.2 23.6 7.6 
Italy 21.2 21.4   
Japan 31.0 29.0 2.0 
Norway 28.3 24.6 3.7 
US 17.2 19.2 -2.0 
Netherlands 25.0 21.4 3.6 
Spain 21.0 22.5 -1.5 
Finland 24.1 23.8 0.2 
Germany 20.7 21.0 -0.3 
Australia 20.8 25.1 -4.4 
Denmark 19.3 19.8 -0.5 
France 20.2 20.5 -0.3 
Canada 20.5 21.7 -1.1 
Korea 32.6 32.1 0.5 
Average 23.3 22.7 0.6 
St. Dev. 5.1 3.7 2.9 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 2 
Gross Household Saving and Investment to GDP 
Country Averages 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 11.7 5.7 6.0 
UK 5.3 4.3 1.0 
Switzerland 11.2 5.9 5.3 
Italy 19.3 7.9 11.5 
Japan 13.2 6.8 6.3 
Norway 5.3 5.9 -0.7 
US 8.5 7.2 1.4 
Netherlands 10.7 6.0 4.7 
Spain 7.9 5.5 2.4 
Finland 5.9 7.1 -1.1 
Germany 11.1 7.5 3.6 
Australia 11.6 9.8 1.8 
Denmark 3.8 4.4 -0.6 
France 9.8 6.7 3.1 
Canada 10.4 6.4 4.0 
Korea 13.1 6.8 6.3 
Average 9.9 6.5 3.4 
St. Dev. 3.8 1.3 3.3 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 3 
Gross Corporate Saving and Investment to GDP 
Country Averages 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 14.1 12.4 1.8 
UK 10.3 11.7 -1.4 
Switzerland 17.4 14.6 2.8 
Italy 6.1 10.7 -4.5 
Japan 14.3 16.8 -2.5 
Norway 14.2 15.3 -1.1 
US 9.2 9.6 -0.4 
Netherlands 10.7 12.1 -1.4 
Spain 12.2 13.5 -1.3 
Finland 12.1 13.4 -1.3 
Germany 9.3 11.4 -2.1 
Australia 8.3 12.3 -4.0 
Denmark 14.6 13.5 1.1 
France 9.1 10.7 -1.6 
Canada 10.3 12.2 -2.0 
Korea 11.9 20.5 -8.6 
Average 11.5 13.2 -1.6 
St. Dev. 2.9 2.7 2.6 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 4 
Gross Government Saving and Investment to GDP 
Country Averages 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium -2.1 2.0 -4.1 
UK 0.1 1.9 -1.8 
Switzerland 2.6 3.1 -0.5 
Italy -4.2 2.9 -7.1 
Japan 3.5 5.4 -1.9 
Norway 8.8 3.4 5.4 
US -0.5 2.5 -3.0 
Netherlands 3.6 3.2 0.4 
Spain 0.9 3.5 -2.6 
Finland 6.1 3.4 2.6 
Germany 0.3 2.1 -1.8 
Australia 0.9 3.1 -2.2 
Denmark 0.9 1.9 -1.0 
France 1.2 3.1 -1.9 
Canada -0.1 3.0 -3.1 
Korea 7.6 4.8 2.8 
Average 1.9 3.1 -1.2 
St. Dev. 3.4 1.0 3.0 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 5 
Gross National Saving and Investment to GDP 
Standard Deviation of Country Rates 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 2.4 1.4 1.8 
UK 1.2 1.8 1.3 
Switzerland 1.9 2.6 2.7 
Italy 1.7 2.5 1.6 
Japan 2.4 2.4 1.0 
Norway 3.4 3.9 5.7 
US 2.1 1.5 1.3 
Netherlands 1.7 1.3 1.5 
Spain 1.6 2.0 1.7 
Finland 3.5 5.0 4.3 
Germany 1.0 2.1 1.3 
Australia 3.0 2.5 1.7 
Denmark 2.5 1.8 2.5 
France 1.8 1.9 1.7 
Canada 2.7 2.3 2.0 
Korea 5.1 4.0 4.7 
Average 2.4 2.4 2.3 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 6 
Gross Household Saving and Investment to GDP 
Standard Deviation of Country Rates 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 1.6 0.7 1.7 
UK 1.7 0.6 2.2 
Switzerland 0.7 0.7 1.1 
Italy 5.7 1.2 4.8 
Japan 2.2 1.1 1.4 
Norway 1.5 1.9 2.7 
US 2.3 0.9 2.2 
Netherlands 1.5 0.7 2.1 
Spain 0.9 0.7 1.3 
Finland 1.6 2.0 2.4 
Germany 0.5 0.6 0.9 
Australia 3.8 1.4 3.3 
Denmark 2.0 0.8 2.4 
France 1.4 1.3 1.5 
Canada 3.3 0.8 3.1 
Korea 4.0 2.0 3.2 
Average 2.2 1.1 2.3 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 7 
Gross Corporate Saving and Investment to GDP 
Standard Deviation of Country Rates 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 1.5 1.1 1.2 
UK 1.7 1.4 2.4 
Switzerland 1.5 1.7 2.0 
Italy 1.7 1.0 2.4 
Japan 2.0 1.7 3.2 
Norway 1.0 2.3 2.0 
US 0.8 1.0 1.1 
Netherlands 1.5 1.2 1.5 
Spain 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Finland 3.3 2.9 4.9 
Germany 0.8 1.3 1.4 
Australia 1.8 1.4 2.4 
Denmark 2.0 1.5 2.4 
France 1.7 1.0 2.0 
Canada 2.0 1.5 2.5 
Korea 1.9 2.7 3.3 
Average 1.7 1.6 2.3 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 8 
Gross Government Saving and Investment to GDP 
Standard Deviation of Country Rates 
Country S I S-I 
Belgium 3.4 0.4 3.6 
UK 2.6 0.5 2.9 
Switzerland 1.4 0.4 1.5 
Italy 3.4 0.5 3.9 
Japan 2.7 0.6 2.8 
Norway 3.8 0.5 4.1 
US 2.0 0.2 1.9 
Netherlands 3.6 0.3 3.7 
Spain 1.9 0.6 2.0 
Finland 4.2 0.4 4.1 
Germany 0.9 0.5 0.7 
Australia 2.1 0.7 2.2 
Denmark 2.8 0.3 3.0 
France 1.8 0.3 1.8 
Canada 3.3 0.5 3.3 
Korea 2.2 0.7 1.8 
Average 2.6 0.5 2.7 
 
 
Coverage: Belgium, 1985; UK, 1987-2003; Switzerland, 1990-2002; Italy, 1980-2003; Japan, 
1980-2002; Norway, 1978-2003; US, 1970-2003; Netherlands, 1980-2003; Spain, 1981-2003; 
Finland, 1975-2003; Germany, 1991-2003; Australia, 1970-2003; Denmark, 1981-2003; France, 
1978-2003; Canada, 1970-2003; Korea, 1975-2003. 
Spurce: OECD (www.sourceoecd.org) 
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Table 9 
Baseline National and Sectorial Feldstein-Horioka Regressions 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Pooled OLS 0.60 
(16.45)*** 
0.173 
(9.29)*** 
0.385 
(10.4)*** 
0.089 
(7.84)*** 
Random 
Effects 
0.496 
(11.88)*** 
0.15 
(6.87)*** 
-0.028 
(-0.6) 
-0.008 
(-0.92) 
Fixed Effects 0.479 
(10.62)*** 
0.146 
(6.4)*** 
-0.059 
(-1.21) 
-0.011 
(-1.33) 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Conditional FH Tests 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Random 
Effects 
0.482 
(13.27)*** 
0.126 
(5.41)*** 
0.055 
(1.13) 
0.049 
(4.8)*** 
Fixed Effects 0.462 
(11.49)*** 
0.118 
(4.77)*** 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.046 
(4.5)*** 
 
 
Table 11 
GMM System FH Estimates 
 
 National Household Corporate Government 
Unconditional 
FH coefficient 
0.543 
(4.02)*** 
0.136 
(1.00) 
0.21 
(0.92) 
-0.054 
(-1.48) 
Conditional 
FH coefficient 
0.433 
(3.25)*** 
0.163 
(2.18)** 
-0.241 
(-2.08)** 
-0.067 
(-2.39)** 
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Table 12 
FH Correlations for Deficit and Surplus Years 
 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects GMM System 
National  
(Deficit) 
0.742 
(22.92)*** 
0.695 
(19.89)*** 
0.766 
(9.75)*** 
National 
(Surplus) 
0.558 
(18.72)*** 
0.513 
(15.59)*** 
0.539 
(7.85)*** 
Household 
(Deficit) 
0.536 
(11.32)*** 
0.524 
(10.9)*** 
0.456 
(1.27) 
Household 
(Surplus) 
0.221 
(10.37)*** 
0.216 
(9.69)*** 
0.192 
(2.6)** 
Corporate 
(Deficit) 
0.301 
(5.93)*** 
0.249 
(4.82)*** 
0.344 
(2.32)** 
Corporate  
(Surplus) 
0.101 
(2.35)** 
0.057 
(1.28) 
0.072 
(0.77) 
Government 
(Deficit) 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
-0.007 
(-0.52) 
-0.04 
(-1.18) 
Goverment 
(Surplus) 
-0.01 
(-0.97) 
-0.014 
(-1.3) 
-0.066 
(-6.2)*** 
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Table 13: Feldstein-Horioka Sectoral Regressions (Pooled Mean Group) 
 
 Pooled 
Mean Group
Mean 
Group 
Hausman 
Test 
(p-value in 
parenthesis)
Dynamic 
Fixed 
Effects 
Total Saving Rate     
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Total Saving) 
0.750 
(10.021)*** 
1.052 
(4.488)*** 
1.84 
(0.17) 
0.709 
(4.583)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.291 
(-7.431)*** 
-0.337 
(-9.950)***
 -0.278 
(-6.361)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Total Saving) 
0.253 
(2.510)** 
0.193 
(2.138)** 
 0.131 
(1.009) 
Constant 1.437 
(3.998)*** 
0.491 
(0.363) 
  
Household Saving 
Rate 
    
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Household Saving) 
0.078 
(2.233)** 
-0.901 
(-1.176) 
2.75 
(0.10) 
0.394 
(1.12) 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.229 
(-5.105)*** 
-0.261 
(-5.517)***
 -0.159 
(-5.841)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Household Saving) 
-0.129 
(-1.382) 
-0.106 
(-1.186) 
 0.499 
(3.142)*** 
Constant 1.364 
(3.831)*** 
1.552 
(4.847)*** 
  
No. of Countries 16 16  16 
No. of Observations 374 374  374 
 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 1%. 
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Table 13: Feldstein-Horioka Sectoral Regressions (Pooled Mean Group) 
(Cont.) 
 
 Pooled 
Mean 
Group 
Mean 
Group 
Hausman Test
(p-value in 
parenthesis) 
Dynamic 
Fixed Effects 
Corporate Investment 
Rate 
    
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Corporate Saving) 
0.585 
(5.451)*** 
6.286 
(1.168) 
1.12 
(0.29) 
0.439 
(3.257)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.337 
(-
12.291)*** 
-0.337 
(-8.727)***
 -0.329 
(-9.75)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Corporate Saving) 
-0.214 
(-2.96)*** 
-0.231 
(-3.144)***
 -0.081 
(-1.09) 
Constant 1.99 
(9.6)*** 
1.187 
(1.036) 
  
Government 
Investment Rate 
    
Long-Run Coefficient 
(Government Saving) 
0.062 
(4.451)*** 
1.72 
(1.117) 
1.16 
(0.28) 
0.083 
(2.759)*** 
Error Correction 
Coefficient 
-0.233 
(-7.84)*** 
-0.284 
(-6.306)***
 -0.194 
(-6.733)*** 
Short-Run Coefficient  
(∆ Government Saving) 
-0.049 
(-3.066)***
-0.058 
(3.030)*** 
 -0.051 
(-6.151)*** 
Constant 0.678 
(5.828)*** 
0.748 
(5.426)*** 
  
No. of Countries 16 16  16 
No. of Observations 374 374  374 
 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 1%. 
 
